Composition and projection of co-speech gestures by Esipova, Maria
Proceedings of SALT 29: 117–137, 2019
Composition and projection of co-speech gestures*
Maria Esipova
New York University
Abstract In this paper I argue against the common assumption in recent literature
that content-bearing gestures co-occurring with speech project in a single uniform
way determined by their co-speech status. Instead, I propose a composition-driven,
modality-neutral approach whereby which projection mechanisms are available or
enforced for a given piece of compositionally integrated content, spoken or gestu-
ral, is determined by how it composes in the syntax/semantics. I adduce experi-
mental data supporting this view from an acceptability judgement task comparing
co-nominal gestures to adnominal adjectives and appositives. More broadly, this
paper establishes the need to treat gestures as bona ﬁde linguistic objects at all lev-
els of representation in order to understand how they contribute to the meaning of
utterances and which aspects of grammar are modality-(in)dependent.
Keywords: composition, projection, co-speech gestures, non-restricting modiﬁers, supple-
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1 Introduction
There has been a recent upsurge in studying how content-bearing gestures con-
tribute to the meaning of otherwise spoken utterances from the perspective of for-
mal semantics and pragmatics (Ebert & Ebert 2014; Ebert 2017; Tieu, Pasternak,
Schlenker & Chemla 2017, 2018; Hunter 2018; Schlenker 2018a,b; Zlogar & David-
son 2018; Esipova 2019, a.o.). Much of this research has been tackling the problem
of gesture projection, i.e., if and how gestures come to be interpreted outside the
semantic scope of various operators (negation, conditional and question operators,
modals, quantiﬁers, etc.) in whose syntactic scope they seem to appear. One type
of gestures that this literature has focused on are co-speech gestures, i.e., content-
bearing gestures co-occurring and associating with spoken expressions, as in (1).1
* This paper summarizes some of my dissertation research, and I thank my committee for feedback
and support: Lucas Champollion (Chair), Ailís Cournane, Kathryn Davidson, Stephanie Harves, and
Philippe Schlenker. I also thank the audiences at NYU, University of Crete, ZAS Berlin, University
of Oslo, and SALT 29. Special thanks to Anna Alsop and Ailís Cournane for help with the stimuli.
1 Approximate word equivalents of gestures are written in ALL CAPS. Co-speech gestures are writ-
ten as SUBSCRIPTS, with underlining indicating their approximate temporal alignment. Gestures are
sometimes illustrated by pictures placed before the approximate onset of the gesture.
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(1) Stephanie might bring her dogLARGE.
→ Stephanie’s dog is large.
There is a general consensus in this literature that such gestures contribute pro-
jecting inferences by default (Ebert & Ebert 2014; Ebert 2017; Tieu et al. 2017,
2018; Schlenker 2018a,b), but there is no consensus on what mechanisms assure
said projection. All of this literature, however, relies on an implicit or explicit as-
sumption that the projection proﬁle of co-speech gestures is uniquely determined
by their co-speech status. In particular, the issue has been presented as a choice
between the view whereby co-speech gestures uniformly project as supplements
(Ebert & Ebert 2014) and the view whereby co-speech gestures uniformly project
as cosuppositions, i.e., assertion-dependent presuppositions (Schlenker 2018a,b).
In this paper I argue that this assumption that there is a single unique way in
which co-speech gestures project is incorrect, and the debate above is insubstantial.
I propose instead a uniform, modality-neutral view of projection whereby how a
given piece of compositionally integrated content, spoken or gestural, projects is de-
termined by how it composes in the syntax/semantics. Gestures like in (1) can com-
pose either as modiﬁers (akin to attributive adjectives), in which case they can be
restricting (truth-conditionally non-vacuous and non-projecting) or non-restricting
(truth-conditionally vacuous and projecting as pragmatically triggered presupposi-
tions), or as supplements, in which case they have to project. I adduce the results of
an acceptability judgement experiment comparing co-nominal gestures to adnomi-
nal adjectives and appositives that support this composition-driven view.
As a more general point, I conclude that in order to build a rigorous theory of
gesture projection—or projection of any secondary modality content, such as fa-
cial expressions or iconic voice modulations in spoken utterances—we need to ask
theoretically meaningful questions about how this content integrates into utterances
at various levels of representation and how this integration is constrained at the
interfaces between these levels. To address these questions, we need to approach
gestures and other secondary modality content as bona ﬁde linguistic objects that
abide by linguistic rules at all levels of representation. The goal of an interested
researcher is thus to determine what these rules are, when they are the same as the
rules for ordinary linguistic expressions, and when and why they are different.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the composition-
driven, cross-modal theory of projection. It establishes the projection patterns of
modiﬁers and supplements and explains how gestures ﬁt into the picture. Sec-
tion 3 reports on the acceptability judgement experiment comparing co-nominal
gestures to spoken adnominal adjectives and appositives. It shows that the view
that co-speech gestures are supplements across the board undergenerates restricting
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readings of gestures, which are shown to be marginally available, and the view that
co-speech gestures trigger cosuppositions across the board overgenerates unattested
readings for DP-adjoining gestures. Section 4 concludes.
2 A composition-driven, cross-modal theory of projection
2.1 Modiﬁers
2.1.1 Composition of modiﬁers
Following the basic working deﬁnition in Morzycki 2015, I will deﬁne a modi-
ﬁer as an expression of type 〈τ,τ〉, and I will also assume that there are further
morphosyntax-based rules for determining which of the two sisters (if either) in a
given conﬁguration is the modiﬁer and which one is the expression being modiﬁed.
For example, in cases of intersective modiﬁcation, the expression being modiﬁed is
the one that projects its syntactic label or features to the parent node.
In this paper I will only focus on subsective modiﬁers, such as in (2), because
(i) the projection behavior of non-subsective modiﬁers, such as in (3), is poorly
understood, and (ii) non-conventionalized gestures, which are the main focus of
this paper, are typically subsective when they are construed of as modiﬁers.
(2) Zoe is a {blond / skillful} stuntwoman.
→ Zoe is a stuntwoman.
(3) Daisy is an alleged murderer.
̸→ Daisy is a murderer.
In a subsective modiﬁcation conﬁguration, the result of modiﬁcation entails the
expression being modiﬁed via generalized entailment. A sub-propositional expres-
sion α whose type ends in t entails another expression of the same type β via gen-
eralized entailment (α ⇒∀ β ) iff α entails β via generalized material implication
(α ⇒ β ) for any values of the arguments α and β take. Generalized material impli-
cation is a lifted version of material implication that can apply to sub-propositional
expressions, just like generalized conjunction (Partee & Rooth 1983) is a lifted ver-
sion of logical conjunction (see also Schlenker 2018a: fn. 25).
Subsective modiﬁers come with this subsective entailment as their characteristic
property. I maintain that all subsective modiﬁers follow the schema in (4), whose
left conjunct assures that the subsective entailment goes through.
(4) Subsective modiﬁcation (composition schema)
In a tree α〈τ1...τn,t〉 whose daughters are γ and β〈τ1...τn,t〉, γ is a subsective
modiﬁer iff γ is a modiﬁer and:JαK = λX1τ1...λXnτN .Jβ K(X1)...(Xn)∧ (...)
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The right conjunct in (4) can be as simple as JγK(X1)...(Xn) for intersective
modiﬁers, such as blond in (5) (assuming those compose via predicate modiﬁca-
tion). Non-subsective modiﬁers, such as skillful in (6), are usually assumed to take
the expression they modify as an argument. I maintain that skillful and its kin still
follow the schema in (4), with the left conjunct responsible for the subsective en-
tailment instead of the latter being an idiosyncratic property of the skillful relation.
(5) Jblond stuntwomanK = λxλw.stntwmn(x)(w)∧blond(x)(w)
(6) Jskillful stuntwomanK = λxλw.stntwmn(x)(w)∧ skillful(stntwmn)(x)(w)
2.1.2 Projection of modiﬁers
When and how do modiﬁers project? All subsective modiﬁers are restrictive in
that they have the compositional potential to restrict the expressions they modify,
i.e., roughly, to yield logically stronger expressions; this potential is the result of
having the right conjunct in the schema in (4). However, not all speciﬁc instances
of modiﬁers realize this potential. Leffel (2014) deﬁnes non-restricting modiﬁers2
(NRMs) as modiﬁers that don’t affect the truth conditions of the utterance in which
they appear. He illustrates this observation via examples like (7). Under the world-
knowledge based assumption that not all chemicals are harmful, but all toxins are,
(7a) doesn’t entail a version of itself without the adjective, but (7b) does.
(7) a. I will eliminate every harmful chemical. restricting modiﬁer
̸→ I will eliminate every chemical.
b. I will eliminate every harmful toxin. non-restricting modiﬁer
→ I will eliminate every toxin.
Leffel’s (partial) deﬁnition of NRMs is given in (8); I propose a reﬁned version
in (9).
(8) Non-restricting modiﬁer in Leffel 2014: (3.58a) (partial)
An occurrence αn of a modiﬁer α in [DP...αn...N...] or [DP...N...αn...] is
non-restricting with respect to index i iff the speaker believes that JDPKi =JDP[αn/ε]Ki, where X [a/b] is the expression just like X except with a token
of a replaced by one of b and ε is the empty string.
(9) Non-restricting modiﬁer (adopted here)
If an utterance u contains a subtree α whose daughters are γ and β and γ is
an occurrence of a subsective modiﬁer, γ is non-restricting at an index i iff
the speaker of i believes that JuKi = Ju[γ/ε]Ki, where X [a/b] is just like X
but with a token of a replaced by one of b and ε is the empty string.
2 He uses the terms “non-restrictive” and “non-restricting” differently from me.
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In contrast to Leffel’s, my deﬁnition is not restricted to adnominal modiﬁers and
is explicitly restricted to subsective modiﬁers (Leffel makes this restriction later).
More importantly, however, I switch to global, utterance-level equivalence from
local, constituent-level one. This is necessary, because Leffel’s deﬁnition is at odds
with the projection behavior of inferences contributed by NRMs, and we need to
separate the deﬁnitional utterance-level truth-conditional vacuity of NRMs, which
holds globally, from the inference about the local equivalence of the expression
being modiﬁed and the result of modiﬁcation, which is sensitive to local contexts.
While NRMs are truth-conditionally vacuous, they still make a meaningful con-
tribution in the form of non-restricting modiﬁer inferences (NRM inferences) that
the expression being modiﬁed entails the result of modiﬁcation (β ⇒∀ α).3 For
example, in (7b), the NRM inference is that being a toxin entails being a harmful
toxin, or, simply put, that all toxins are harmful.
However, unlike what is suggested by Leffel’s deﬁnition in (8), this entailment
doesn’t always hold in all of the speaker’s belief worlds. Rather, what the speaker
has to believe is that this entailment holds relative to the local context (Karttunen
1974; Stalnaker 1974; Heim 1983; Schlenker 2009, a.o.) of the modiﬁcation con-
ﬁguration. For example, in both (10) and (11), the speaker intends the modiﬁer as
truth-conditionally vacuous. However, in (10), the (propositional) local context of
the modiﬁcation conﬁguration is equivalent to the Stalnakerian global context set
C (Stalnaker 1974), thus, we get a global inference that (the speaker believes that)
being a sausage entails being a deadly sausage, i.e., that all sausages are deadly. In
(11), however, we get a conditionalized inference that (the speaker believes) that if
processed meat causes cancer, all sausages are deadly.
(10) Context: The speaker believes that processed meat causes cancer.
I shouldn’t eat so many deadly sausages.
→ All sausages are deadly.
(11) Context: The speaker just read an article saying that processed meat might
be causing cancer, but they are not ready to embrace it as a fact just yet.
{Maybe processed meat causes cancer and / If processed meat causes can-
cer,} I shouldn’t eat so many deadly sausages.
→ If processed meat causes cancer, all sausages are deadly.
For comparison, local context sensitivity of lexical presuppositions is illustrated
for know below.
(12) Zoe knows that she can’t continue the race.
→ Zoe can’t continue the race.
3 Or, rather, that the two entail each other (α ⇔∀ β ), however the entailment from the result of modi-
ﬁcation to the expression being modiﬁed (α ⇒∀ β ) is assured by the modiﬁer being subsective.
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(13) {Maybe Zoe’s car has been damaged and / If Zoe’s car has been damaged,}
she knows that she can’t continue the race.
→ If Zoe’s car has been damaged, she can’t continue the race.
While NRM inferences project similarly to lexical presuppositions, we don’t
have to maintain that they are triggered in the semantics, be it lexically or as part of
a composition rule (as is proposed in Leffel 2014). I propose that NRM inferences
are triggered pragmatically whenever the addressee concludes that the speaker in-
tends for a given instance of a modiﬁer to be non-restricting, i.e., truth-conditionally
vacuous. Thus, I deﬁne non-restricting modiﬁer inferences as follows:
(14) Non-restricting modiﬁer inference
If an elementary clause p contains a subtree α whose daughters are γ and
β and the addressee infers that the speaker intends γ as a non-restricting
modiﬁer (as deﬁned in (9)), the addressee will generate the non-restricting
modiﬁer inference: c′′⇒∀ (β ⇒ α), where c′′ is the sub-propositional local
context of α in the propositional local context c′ of p.
I assume Schlenker’s (2009; 2010) pragmatic approach to local contexts, which
deﬁnes the local context c′ of any expression d whose type ends in t as the strongest
possible restriction one could make before interpreting d in a Stalnakerian context
set C. The propositional local context c′ for the elementary clause p containing
the modiﬁer is computed, for example, by updating the global context C with the
left conjunct under maybe or the antecedent of a conditional, as in (11). The sub-
propositional local context c′′ is computed within p for the result of modiﬁcation α
and is always relativized to c′. In simple cases this means that the world argument
of c′′ is restricted to the worlds of c′.
Thus, if the addressee recognizes that the speaker intends deadly as truth-condi-
tionally vacuous in (10), they will generate the inference that (the speaker believes
that) in all the worlds of the global context C being a sausage entails being a deadly
sausage, i.e., all sausages are deadly. But in (11), the NRM inference would be that
all sausages are deadly in all the worlds in which processed meat causes cancer.4
One crucial difference between lexical presuppositions and NRM inferences is
that while the former can sometimes be interpreted locally under semantic operators
via local accommodation (e.g., Heim 1983; Schlenker 2009), this is not a meaning-
ful option for NRM inferences. Local accommodation makes the affected piece
of content truth-conditionally non-vacuous, however, if a modiﬁer is meant to be
truth-conditionally non-vacuous, it can’t be non-restricting, so no NRM inference
will be generated in the ﬁrst place. Empirically, the contrast is illustrated in (15).5
4 For simplicity I am assuming that the sub-propositional local context c′′ is maximally broad in both
cases, i.e., that it denotes λxλw.Jc′K(w)∧De(x), where De is the domain of individuals in the model.
5 Bold indicates prosodic contrastive focus marking.
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(15) Context: Zoe, Lucy, and Pam are going on a camping trip. Pam is coming
from Boston to New York to join the rest of the group. Zoe and Lucy are
discussing how to get to the camping site from New York. ...
a. ...They have agreed that they need a car, no matter how big. Lucy:
? I don’t know if Pam has a car, but if she’s coming in her car, we can
use it to get to the camping site.
‘...if (she has a car and she’s coming in her car)...’
b. ...They have agreed that they need a large car to ﬁt all their supplies. Lucy
knows that Pam has exactly one car. Lucy:
# I don’t know if Pam’s car is large, but if she’s coming in {her large car
/ her large car}, we can use it to get to the camping site.
Intended: ‘...if ({she has a large car / her car is large} and she’s coming
in her large car)...’
In (15a), the existence inference of the deﬁnite description her car cannot be
satisﬁed globally, but it can be marginally interpreted locally under if, resulting in an
imperfect but relatively acceptable utterance. However, locally accommodating the
existence inference of the deﬁnite description is not enough in (15b); the modiﬁer
has to be non-restricting as Pam only has one car,6 but its NRM inference can’t
project in the context, which results in complete infelicitousness.
2.1.3 NRM inferences and cosuppositions
The deﬁnition of NRM inferences in (14) is reminiscent of cosuppositions, i.e.,
assertion-dependent inferences that project like presuppositions, originally proposed
in Schlenker 2018a as inferences triggered by co-speech gestures across the board
and extended to other types of content in Schlenker 2018b,c. In (16), I give Schlen-
ker’s (partial) generalized deﬁnition of cosuppositions from Schlenker 2018c.7
(16) Cosuppositions in Schlenker 2018c: (67) (partial, w/notational changes)
a. A cosupposition is triggered when an elementary expression pp′ has an
entailment p′ which is presented as being unimportant, and for this reason
the global Context Set C should guarantee that, relative to its local context
c′, pp′ should be equivalent to p, i.e.: (i) c′⇒∀ (pp′⇔ p)
6 I assume that each modiﬁer is either restricting or non-restricting, and, furthermore, restricting mod-
iﬁers have to pick out a (locally) non-empty part of the denotation of the expression they modify.
7 While (16) only makes reference to the global context set C and a single local context c′, Philippe
Schlenker (p.c.) has conﬁrmed to me that for a non-propositional pp′ we need to compute two local
contexts, a propositional one and a sub-propositional one, just like in (14).
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b. (i) is equivalent to the standard deﬁnition of cosuppositions: (ii) c′ ⇒∀
(p⇒ p′)8
Schlenker’s algorithm in (16) is, on the one hand, unconstrained in that it isn’t
linked to any speciﬁc compositional conﬁguration (it can even apply if p and p′
don’t combine compositionally at all and are instead two pieces of a single lexical
entry pp′). This leads to overgeneration when the purported cosupposition trigger
cannot be a modiﬁer (as deﬁned in this paper), as we will see in the next section.
On the other hand, Schlenker assumes that p and p′ are conjuncts within pp′
(whether or not they combine compositionally) and that p′ is, thus, an entailment of
pp′, which is too restrictive, as this prevents cosuppositions from arising in cases
where p and p′ are of different semantic types (pp′ can’t entail p′ if they are of
different types, nor can p and p′ conjoin in this case). The consequence of that is
that while Schlenker’s cosupposition algorithm generates the same inferences for
intersective NRMs as the algorithm in (14), it can’t apply to non-intersective modi-
ﬁers, which are not of the same type as the expression they modify or the result of
modiﬁcation.9 The inability to handle non-intersective modiﬁers is also a problem
for Leffel’s (2014) analysis of NRM inferences as semantic presuppositions hard-
coded into the composition rule for NRMs (more generally, it’s unclear how Leffel’s
analysis of NRMs would generalize beyond adnominal intersective modiﬁcation).
Note that simply switching to the ‘daughter entails parent’ formulation from
‘sister entails sister’ to allow cosuppositions for non-intersective modiﬁers doesn’t
ﬁll the need for constraining cosuppositions, which is the main issue with Schlen-
ker’s view. Rethinking cosuppositions as NRM inferences both constrains them
in the right way (as we’ll see in section 3) and allows generating them for non-
intersective modiﬁers. In other words, ﬁxing the technical bug doesn’t address the
bigger issue, but addressing the bigger issue ﬁxes the technical bug along the way.
2.2 Composition and projection of supplements
2.2.1 Composition of supplements
Supplements, most obviously exempliﬁed by appositives, compose with anchor ex-
pressions and contribute propositions of a special kind about those anchors. For
adnominal appositives, whose anchors are individuals, this means that they com-
pose with DPs (Determiner Phrases, type e or 〈〈e,st〉, t〉)—as opposed to attributive
8 Here Schlenker refers to the formulation of cosuppositions in Schlenker 2018a.
9 One of the cases mentioned in Schlenker 2018c is the degree modiﬁer ‘completely’ in Italian Sign
Language and spoken Italian discussed by Aristodemo (2017), who argues that both cases give rise to
a projecting inference (e.g., ‘full’ entails ‘completely full’), which she analyzes as a cosupposition.
But degree modiﬁers are non-intersective, so the algorithm in (16) can’t yield this result.
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adjectives, which compose with NPs (Noun Phrases, type 〈e,st〉). For example, in
(17), the appositive (who is) a stuntwoman10 composes with the DP Zoe denoting
the individual Zoe and contributes the proposition that Zoe is a stuntwoman.
(17) I invited Zoe, (who is) a stuntwoman.
→ Zoe is a stuntwoman.
Whichever speciﬁc account of appositives one assumes, the general outcome
is the same: appositives are non-restrictive, because the way they compose with
their anchors doesn’t allow them to restrict anything. For example, Potts (2005)
assumes bidimensional semantics whereby the anchor ﬁlls the argument slot of the
appositive yielding a proposition of a special, conventional implicature type. Koev
(2013) and AnderBois, Brasoveanu & Henderson (2013) assume a dynamic unidi-
mensional setup instead, whereby appositives introduce propositional discourse ref-
erents of a special kind; the link between appositives and their anchors is anaphoric.
The consequence of this composition that appositives can never be restricting
is borne out empirically. For example, in (18a), the two contrasted nominals are
prosodically integrated,11 adjoin at the NP-level,12 are, thus, modiﬁers and can,
thus, be restricting. However, (18b) is infelicitous, precisely because appositives,
which are packaged into their own prosodic phrases and adjoin at the DP-level,
can’t ever be restricting.
(18) a. (PrP I invited Zoe the stuntwoman), (PrP not Zoe the politician).
b. # (PrP I invited Zoe), (PrP the stuntwoman), (PrP not Zoe), (PrP the politi-
cian).
2.2.2 Projection of supplements
Supplements project, and typically they project very strongly, i.e., they typically
cannot be interpreted locally under semantic operators, not even under pressure:
(19) a. If you invite Zoe, a stuntwoman, you should show her your muscle car.
→ Zoe is a stuntwoman.
b. # I don’t know if Zoe is a stuntwoman, but if you invite Zoe, a stunt-
woman, you should show her your muscle car.
Intended: ‘...if (Zoe is a stuntwoman and you invite her)...’
10 Here I assume that nominal appositives contain silent syntactic structure making them similar to
full-blown appositive relative clauses (cf. Zoe, (who is) often called the most talented stuntwoman).
This assumption isn’t crucial, however, and whether there any syntactic differences between the two
structures is immaterial for the purposes of this paper.
11 PrP stands for “prosodic phrase”, whether it is an intermediate or an intonational phrase.
12 I follow Matushansky (2008) in that proper nouns have an NP layer denoting the property of being
named in a certain way.
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How exactly one accounts for supplement projection is immaterial for the pur-
poses of this paper. For example, in both Potts 2005 and AnderBois et al. 2013,
projection of supplements is assured by the propositions they contribute being spe-
cial in a way that makes them impervious to semantic operators. In Potts 2005,
these propositions have a special semantic type, and in AnderBois et al. 2013 they
are a special type of discourse referents. Either option works for me.
Schlenker (2013) discusses apparent exceptions to the projection requirement
on appositives, such as (20).
(20) If tomorrow I call the Chair, who in turn calls the Dean, we will be in deep
trouble.
̸→ If tomorrow I call the Chair, they will call the Dean.
≈ ‘If (tomorrow I call the Chair and they call the Dean)...’
Such interpretations are very constrained, however (see Jasinskaja & Poschmann
2018 for generalizations on when they are available). The crucial difference be-
tween modiﬁers and supplements with respect to projection is, thus, that for a mod-
iﬁer not to project means to be restricting, and this interpretation is in principle
available to any modiﬁer by default. Whether a given instance of a modiﬁer is
interpreted as restricting (and, therefore, non-projecting) or non-restricting (and,
therefore, projecting) is determined by a variety of utterance-external factors. In
supplements, however, projection is systematically triggered by a certain compo-
sitional conﬁguration (e.g., that of an appositive or a sentence-level adverb), and
local interpretations are only available under very limited circumstances.
This difference leads me to conclude that we do need two separate projec-
tion mechanisms for NRMs and supplements. A reductionist story like the one
in Morzycki 2008, whereby NRMs contribute Pottsian (2005) conventional impli-
catures, fails to capture this contrast in availability of local interpretations. Even if
we use the same machinery to assure lack of interaction with semantic operators for
the two types of projecting inferences (i.e., projection proper), we would still need
two separate triggering mechanisms. In subsection 2.1.2, I proposed that triggering
of NRM inferences is pragmatic in nature. I am not proposing any new mechanism
for supplements, but it is clear that triggering of projecting inferences in supple-
ments is much more systematic, much more conventional, and, thus, much more
semantic, which is how it is implemented in most existing analyses of supplements.
2.3 Fitting gestures into the picture
I propose that the setup above applies straight-forwardly to compositionally inte-
grated secondary modality content, including gestures. I maintain a “no gesture-
speciﬁc composition” principle whereby if a gesture integrates compositionally into
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an utterance, it can do it in all and only ways available to spoken content. Thus, ges-
tures can in principle compose as modiﬁers or supplements, as long as their iconic
content is compatible with both construals, and there are no further constraints on
their composition. In particular, non-conventionalized size gestures such as in (1)
can be easily construed of as representing a property (akin to large), in which case
they adjoin to NPs and compose as modiﬁers, or as representing an object (akin to
a large object), in which case they adjoin to DPs and compose as supplements.
However, I agree with the general view in the existing literature that co-occur-
rence with spoken expressions does make gestures more likely to be perceived as
truth-conditionally vacuous. For supplement gestures, this doesn’t have any ad-
ditional consequences, since those are typically truth-conditionally vacuous and
project as is. For modiﬁer gestures, this has the consequence that they are more
likely to be interpreted as non-restricting and, thus, contributing projecting infer-
ences as well. Yet, this preference can be overridden, and gestures whose iconic
content is in principle compatible with a modiﬁer construal can also be restricting,
in which case they are truth-conditionally non-vacuous and don’t project.
Of course, compositional conﬁgurations available to a given instance of a ges-
ture will be constrained by various factors, such as its iconic content, its conven-
tionalized morphosyntactic and lexical properties (if any), and various interface
considerations. For example, in Esipova 2018a,b, I discuss how modiﬁer construals
are unlikely for prosodically independent (i.e., non-co-speech) gestures in English
because of the English linearization rules as well as interaction of universal articu-
latory considerations with the English rules of syntax-sensitive prosodic grouping.
However, under the modality-neutral, composition-driven approach to projection
that I advocate for here, the co-speech status of a gesture does not directly and
uniformly determine how this gesture will project.
The summary of the view presented in this section is given in Table 1.
3 Experiment: adjectives, appositives, gestures
3.1 Goals of the study
The composition-driven theory of gesture projection presented in the previous sec-
tion as well as the alternative theories in Ebert & Ebert 2014 (the supplemental
theory, under which all co-speech gestures are supplements) and Schlenker 2018a
(the cosuppositional theory, under which all co-speech gestures trigger cosupposi-
tions) make speciﬁc predictions regarding how co-speech gestures such as in (1)
can and cannot be interpreted. In particular, while all the three theories predict that
co-speech gestures prefer to project, they differ on whether they predict the possi-
bility of local (i.e., non-projecting) interpretations, and if yes, what kind of local
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(Subsective) modiﬁers Supplements
Compose with β , yielding α such that
α entails β
Compose with β , yielding a
proposition of a special kind about β
Can be restricting or non-restricting Can never be restricting
Trigger projecting inferences when
non-restricting; triggering is pragmatic
Almost always trigger projecting
inferences; triggering is conventional
Examples (target content bolded):
• attributive adjectives (her large dog)
• restrictive relative clauses (her dog
that’s large)
• degree modiﬁers (completely full)
• NP-level gestures
(her [[NP dog]LARGE])
Examples (target content bolded):
• appositives (her dog, (who is) a large
animal)
• sentence-level adverbs (Surprisingly,
Zoe won the race)
• DP-level gestures
([[DP her dog]LARGE])
Table 1 Modiﬁers vs. supplements
interpretations they predict to be possible. There are at least two conceivable local
interpretations for co-speech gestures. One is that of a restricting modiﬁer (which I
will label ‘Restricting’), and the other is a hypothetical interpretation corresponding
to a locally interpreted NRM inference or a locally interpreted supplement (which
I will label ‘Non-projecting non-restricting’), as illustrated in (21).
(21) If Stephanie’s bringing her dogLARGE, we should get a bigger van.
Projecting non-restricting interpretation: → Stephanie’s only dog is large.
Restricting interpretation: ≈ ‘If Stephanie’s bringing her large dog, but not
her small one...’
Non-projecting non-restricting interpretation: ≈ ‘If (Stephanie’s only dog is
large and she’s bringing her large dog)...’
Previous experimental studies on gesture projection (Tieu et al. 2017, 2018; Es-
ipova 2019) concluded that local interpretations of co-speech gestures are in princi-
ple possible, but none of them was designed to distinguish between the two types of
local interpretations above. The goal of this study is to do so and to test the relevant
predictions of the three theories via an acceptability judgement task.
3.2 Methods
Participants were recruited on Amazon Mechnical Turk and paid $1 each. Those
who failed the attention check or reported being non-native speakers of English
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were excluded. The ﬁnal number of participants was 122 (33 female, 89 male).
Participants read context paragraphs, watched videos of sentences uttered in
those contexts, and assessed these sentences by dragging a slider on a pseudo-
continuous scale from ‘Totally unnatural’ to ‘Totally natural’ (mapped to 0–100).
The items differed along two fully-crossed factors: Content Type (Adjective,
Appositive, Gesture) and Interpretation (Projecting non-restricting, Restricting, Non-
projecting non-restricting), yielding 9 conditions. The target interpretation was en-
forced within each video by setting up the question under discussion (QUD) and
explicitly contrasting two alternatives; the written contexts were meant to maxi-
mally support this interpretation. 4 complete test paradigms (for 4 different sce-
nario types) were constructed, yielding 36 test items in total. All the videos used in
the experiment can be found at https://osf.io/fr5xt/.
A complete sample paradigm is given in (22). All the written contexts (in italics)
in this paradigm started in the same way, setting up the van-renting scenario. They
then continued in three different ways, setting up the subscenario supporting one
of the three target interpretations. Three videos were then recorded for each of the
three written contexts: with adjectives, appositives, and gestures.
(22) Context: We are going on a group tour. Anna and Maria are responsible for
renting a van. Maria just told Anna that...
a. Projecting non-restricting: ...Stephanie, who has two pets, a small cat and
a large dog, is planning to bring along one of her pets. Anna, who has
seen both Stephanie’s pets before, says:
Do you know which one of Stephanie’s pets is coming with us? ’Cause if
she’s bringing (i) her small cat, (ii) her cat, a small animal, (iii)
her catSMALL, we’ll be ﬁne, but if she’s bringing (i) her large dog, (ii)
her dog, a large animal, (iii) her dogLARGE, we should get
a bigger van.
b. Restricting: ...Stephanie, who has two dogs, a small Pug and a large Great
Dane, is planning to bring along one of her dogs. Anna, who has seen both
Stephanie’s dogs before, says:
Do you know which one of Stephanie’s dogs is coming with us? ’Cause
if she’s bringing (i) her small dog, (ii) her dog, a small animal, (iii) her
dogSMALL, we’ll be ﬁne, but if she’s bringing (i) her large dog, (ii) her
dog, a large animal, (iii) her dogLARGE, we should get a bigger van.
c. Non-projecting non-restricting: ...Stephanie is planning to bring along
her dog. Anna knows that Stephanie only has one dog, but has never seen
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it. She says:
Do you know how big Stephanie’s dog is? ’Cause if she’s bringing (i) her
small dog, (ii) her dog, a small animal, (iii) her dogSMALL, we’ll be ﬁne,
but if she’s bringing (i) her large dog, (ii) her dog, a large animal, (iii)
her dogLARGE, we should get a bigger van.
In (22a), the expressions of interest can’t be restricting, as Stephanie only has
one cat and one dog,13 hence the ‘non-restricting’ part of the interpretation label.
Furthermore, the QUD is about which of her two pets Stephanie is bringing, not
their size, so the contributions of the expressions of interest are allowed to project,
hence the ‘projecting’ part. In (22b), the expressions of interest are restricting the
expressions they combine with, as Stephanie has two dogs and these expressions are
meant to pick out one of them based on size. In (22c), the expressions of interest
aren’t restricting the expressions they combine with, as Stephanie only has one dog,
hence the ‘non-restricting’ part of the interpretation label. Furthermore, the QUD
is about the size of Stephanie’s dog, and it’s clear from the question Anna asks that
she doesn’t know what size it is, so the contributions of the expressions of interest
have to be interpreted locally under if, hence the ‘non-projecting’ part.
The design was within subjects. Each participant saw one randomly selected
item per condition (thus, 9 test items) and 2 additional items (thus, 11 items in
total), presented in random order. One of the additional items was an attention
check where the participant was instructed to drag the slider all the way to the left
or to the right. The other one had a mismatch between the written context and the
video sentence; the context corresponded to the ‘Non-projecting non-restricting’
interpretation, but the sentence in the video had restricting adjectives. This item was
added to assess whether participants were paying attention to the written contexts
and as an informal baseline for degradedness.
3.3 Predictions of the different theories of co-speech gestures
Let us now review the predictions made by the three theories of co-speech gestures
(supplemental, cosuppositional, composition-driven) regarding the thee potential
interpretations in (21). All the three theories predict ‘Projecting non-restricting’
interpretations to be highly acceptable for co-speech gestures; the differences arise
for the other two interpretation types.
The supplemental analysis predicts that co-speech gestures should pattern with
appositives regarding the relative acceptability of ‘Restricting’ and ‘Non-projecting
13 The assumption here is that the extensions of cat and dog are restricted to Stephanie’s cats and dogs
only, either via domain restriction or via indices on cat and dog. Leffel (2014) uses the latter option
for possessive DPs, but concedes the need for pragmatic domain restriction for some other cases.
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non-restricting’ interpretations; the expectation is that the acceptability ratings should
be relatively low for both interpretation types for both content types.
The predictions of the cosuppositional analysis are a bit harder to assess. In
general, it allows for local interpretations of co-speech gestures, either by locally
accommodating the cosupposition or by failing to generate it in the ﬁrst place (both
are assumed to be costly). In both cases, the result is equivalent to simply conjoining
the gesture to the spoken expression it adjoins to. For co-nominal gestures, if a
gesture adjoining to an NP (type 〈e,st〉) is interpreted locally, the cosuppositional
analysis predicts the (possibility of) the ‘Restricting’ interpretation for it. However,
if a co-nominal gesture adjoins to a DP (type 〈〈e,st〉, t〉14), the local interpretation
predicted by the cosuppositional theory depends on the lexical semantics one posits
for DP-level gestures, which Schlenker himself doesn’t discuss.15
Under a natural assumption that an 〈〈e,st〉, t〉-type LARGE is an indeﬁnite akin
to ‘a large object’, conjoining it to the spoken DP her dog would yield the inter-
pretation ‘Stephanie’s bringing her dog and a large object’ for Stephanie’s bringing
[[DP her dog]LARGE], which is very clearly unattested. Giving indeﬁnite-like se-
mantics to DP-level gestures also yields unattested results if the cosupposition is
generated and projects when the spoken DP is a quantiﬁer like no dog. To intro-
duce the missing link between the spoken DP and the gesture adjoining to it and to
block gestures from adjoining to DPs that don’t introduce discourse referents, one
could say that DP-level co-speech gestures are anaphoric to the DPs they adjoin
to, as in (23). This essentially amounts to giving DP-level gestures appositive-like
semantics while trying to preserve cosupposition-like composition and projection.
(23) JLARGEiKg = λPλw.P(g(i))(w)∧ large(g(i))(w)
≈ ‘that object, and that object is large’
Assuming such semantics for DP-level gestures would yield decent results for
projection of the purported cosupposition (if it is further assumed that its local con-
text is also anaphorically linked to the spoken DP). However, locally interpreting
the gesture in Stephanie’s bringing [[DP her dog]LARGE] would yield ‘Stephanie’s
bringing [her dog]i and iti is large’, which corresponds to the ‘Non-projecting non-
14 I assume that the DP will have to be interpreted as a generalized quantiﬁer, as it is unclear what it
would mean for two individuals to entail one another.
15 One can’t tell if a co-nominal gesture adjoins at the NP- or DP-level based on its temporal alignment,
at least not in the items used in this experiment. In particular, the preparatory phase of the gesture
often starts before the spoken DP (as can be seen in the videos for this experiment and the ones in
Esipova 2019; in both cases the gesture models were instructed to produce the gestures in the way
that was most natural to them). I, thus, assume that both syntactic construals are in principle possible
for all the gestures in the experiment. Timing the gesture with the NP only is likely to be unnatural.
It’s furthermore unclear if doing so would in fact force the NP-level construal, and if it does, what it
would give us, since it’s the DP-level construal that is more constrained in how it can be interpreted.
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restricting’ interpretation in (22c). Since under the cosuppositional analysis all local
interpretations of co-speech gestures result from the same mechanism (local accom-
modation or non-generation of the cosupposition), they should be equally available
regardless of where the gesture adjoins. Thus, if one assumes the semantics like in
(23) for DP-level gestures, ‘Restricting’ and ‘Non-projecting non-restricting’ inter-
pretations of co-speech gestures should be equally available.
The composition-driven view predicts that ‘Restricting’ interpretations should
be available, because modiﬁer gestures can in principle have them, but degraded
as compared to ‘Projecting non-restricting’ ones, because co-speech gestures do
prefer to be truth-conditionally vacuous. ‘Non-projecting non-restricting’ inter-
pretations are expected to be as unavailable for co-speech gestures as for adjec-
tives and supplements. Modiﬁer gestures can’t have them because only truth-
conditionally vacuous modiﬁers can be non-restricting, and the modiﬁer would not
be truth-conditionally vacuous under the ‘Non-projecting non-restricting’ interpre-
tation. Supplement gestures can’t have them, because supplements have to project.
The predictions of the three theories are summarized in Table 2.
supplemental cosuppositional composition-driven
gestures should pattern
like appositives
PNR > (R = NPNR)
(w/further assumptions)
PNR > R > NPNR
Table 2 Predictions for the three interpretations in the Gesture condition
3.4 Results and discussion
Spreadsheets with the raw and cleaned up data are published along with this paper.
All statistical tests and plots were done in R (2019); the code is published along with
this paper. The data were subsetted based on Content Type, and a mixed effects lin-
ear regression model was run for each subset with Interpretation as a ﬁxed effect,
and Participant and Scenario Type as random effects. Once the signiﬁcant effect of
Interpretation was established, pairwise comparisons between different interpreta-
tions were performed via similar models. The results are visualized in Figure 1, and
the statistics are given in Table 3. The mean % acceptability for mismatch items was
39, which is not signiﬁcantly different from that of ‘Non-projecting non-restricting’
items with adjectives (Beta = −.041, t = −.858, p = .393).
As expected, ‘Projecting non-restricting’ and ‘Restricting’ interpretations of
adjectives are equally and highly acceptable, but ‘Non-projecting non-restricting’
ones are much less acceptable. Also as expected, only ‘Projecting non-restricting’
interpretations are highly acceptable for appositives; ‘Restricting’ and ‘Non-project-
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Figure 1 Bar chart showing % acceptability of different interpretations per con-
tent type. Error bars show standard error. Dots represent individual
responses (jitter was added for better visualization).
ing non-restricting’ interpretations are much less acceptable, with no signiﬁcant
difference between the two. ‘Projecting non-restricting’ interpretations of gestures
are highly acceptable, just like for adjectives and appositives. ‘Non-projecting non-
restricting’ interpretations of co-nominal gestures are much less acceptable, again,
just like for adjectives and appositives. Crucially, however, ‘Restricting’ interpre-
tations of gestures are marginal; they are signiﬁcantly more acceptable than ‘Non-
projecting non-restricting’ ones (in contrast to appositives), but signiﬁcantly less
acceptable than ‘Projecting non-restricting’ ones (in contrast to adjectives).
The data at hand match the predictions of the composition-driven theory only.
Contra the supplemental theory, co-speech gestures do not pattern with appositives
regarding the acceptability of ‘Restricting’ interpretations. Contra the cosuppo-
sitional theory (under additional assumptions), ‘Restricting’ and ‘Non-projecting
non-restricting’ interpretations of co-speech gestures are not equally acceptable.
4 Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that contra the pervasive assumption in the literature,
there is no single way in which co-speech gestures project. While the observa-
tion that co-speech gestures prefer to be truth-conditionally vacuous made in the
previous literature (Ebert & Ebert 2014; Schlenker 2018a; Tieu et al. 2017, 2018)
is correct, how exactly this truth-conditional vacuity is assured depends on how a
given instance of a gesture composes in the syntax/semantics. In this respect ges-
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Content Mean % acceptability Comparisons
PNR R NPNR PNR/R PNR/NPNR R/NPNR
Adjectives 86.0 85.9 42.4 NS
Beta = .001
t = .03
p = .976
***
Beta = .565
t = 10.71
p < 2e−16
***
Beta = .568
t = 10.842
p < 2e−16
Appositives 78.9 47.4 52.4 ***
Beta = .49
t = 10.35
p < 2e−16
***
Beta = .398
t = 8.057
p = 6.28e−13
NS
Beta = −.077
t = −1.628
p = .106
Gestures 84.6 68.4 50.5 ***
Beta = .301
t = 6.298
p = 5.43e−09
***
Beta = .513
t = 10.95
p < 2e−16
***
Beta = .277
t = 5.459
p = 2.59e−07
Table 3 Statistics for acceptability of different interpretations per content type
tures are no different from spoken expressions. In particular, gestures construed
of as modiﬁers can be restricting or non-restricting and only project when they are
non-restricting; restricting interpretations of co-speech gestures are dispreferred,
because restricting modiﬁers are truth-conditionally non-vacuous, but available.
Gestures construed of as supplements can’t be interpreted locally at all, because
supplements in general can’t. This view ﬁts the empirical picture from section 3,
which cannot be captured by theories that rely on the assumption that there is a
single way in which all co-speech gestures project.
Going back to the point raised in the Introduction, treating gestures as bona
ﬁde linguistic objects at all levels of representation is what allowed us to arrive
at this more nuanced and empirically adequate view of gesture projection. Fur-
thermore, the results of the present study suggest that narrow syntax and compo-
sitional semantics are modality-blind, i.e., how a given piece of content integrates
compositionally into an utterance doesn’t depend on whether it’s spelled out as a
spoken item from the lexicon or as a gesture that is not necessarily stored in the
lexicon. Modality-speciﬁc effects, however, manifest in the interaction of lineariza-
tion and pragmatics. In particular, co-occurrence with material in a more primary
modality (which is, of course, an impossible conﬁguration for spoken lexical items)
has been conﬁrmed to result in a preference for truth-conditional vacuity for ges-
tures. Grounding future work on gesture and other secondary modality content in
a systematic interface-based approach can, thus, both yield a more ﬁne-grained un-
derstanding of such content and provide insights into which aspects of linguistic
behavior are modality-independent and which are not.
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